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UNVEILING PROTECTIONISM: ANTI-DUMPING, THE
GATT, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
PATRICK GAYt

While anti-dumping actions taken under the auspices of the CATT are
becoming increasingly prevalent, many commentators have questioned their
economic justification and called for the replacement of current anti-dumping
provisions with a system based upon competition law principles. This paper
reviews the economic analyses, in light ofpolitical considerations, and suggests
that calls for for reaching reforms are premature and ignore the important
safety valve function of anti-dumping measures. The paper concludes that a
public economic interest provision should be added to the CATT AntiDumping Code, and that anti-dumping regulation should be subsumed
within expanded safeguard provisions of the GA TT in order to enhance the
legitimacy and transparency of the system while reducing its use.
Meme si les poursuites judiciaires contre le dumping sous !'auspice du CATT
deviennent de plus en plus nombreuses, plusieurs auteurs s 'interrogent sur
leur justification economique. Ces auteurs demandent que !es dispositions
actuellement en vigueur soient remplacees par un systeme fonde sur !es
memes principes que ceux soutendant la loi sur la concurrence. Ce travail
revise cette analyse economique a la lumiere des considerants politiques et
suggere que les appels pour une reforme ayant une portee aussi large que celle
expose si-haut sont prematures et ne tiennent pas compte de !'importance des
dispositions sur le dumping, soit d'agir comme soupape de surete. L 'auteur
conclut que la legitimation et !'amelioration de la transparance du systeme,
ainsi qu'une reduction de son usage pourrait s'accomplir, d'une part, en
inshant des dispositions concernant l'inthet publique economique dans le
Code Antidumping du GA TT, et d'autre part, en inshant les reglements
contre le dumping dans !es dispositions de sauvegarde du CATT.

The use of anti-dumping duties as a defence against supposedly
unfair importation of cheap goods began with Canadian legislation
in 1904. Following the development of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), anti-dumping action was both condoned
and regulated by the provisions of Article VI of the GATT and a

t B.A. (Hons.) (McGill), LLB., M.P.A. anticipated 1998 (Dalhousie).
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series of anti-dumping codes. Despite GATT approval, anti-dumping
actions were not a frequent occurrence during the first decades of
the GATT. For example, in 1958 an official tally showed a total of
thirty-seven anti-dumping measures in force across all of the
contracting parties to the GATT. 1 During the mid-1970s however,
the number of anti-dumping investigations initiated by the major
anti-dumping users, namely the European Union (Eu), Canada, the
United States (u.s.), and Australia, began to escalate at a rapid rate.
Although there was some abatement during the late 1980s, by 1994
2
there were 778 anti-dumping measures in force within the GATT.
With their rising use anti-dumping measures and legislation became
the target of increased academic scrutiny. As a result of such
scrutiny, the economic rationale for dumping has been revealed as
marginal, and anti-dumping has been condemned as a form of
veiled protectionism that works against the freer trade principles of
the GATT. This in turn has led to arguments that the GATT antidumping provisions and GATT endorsed domestic anti-dumping
regimes should be scrapped and replaced by a system based upon
competition law principles.
This article will review the position of anti-dumping within the
GATT and analyze the economic critique of anti-dumping regimes.
It will be demonstrated that the current anti-dumping system is not
consistent with the stated objectives of the GATT. The economic
rational for anti-dumping is severely limited, and the application of
anti-dumping laws appears to run counter to the GATT principle of
national treatment. Despite this, calls for the replacement of antidumping laws with a competition law based regime will not be
supported. Such reform is unrealistic given the context of current
discussions on the internationalization of competition law.
Furthermore, the economic analyses that support such conclusions
does not sufficiently address political considerations, as it
undervalues the use of anti-dumping laws as an institutionsupporting safety valve to divert domestic protectionist pressures.
It will be argued that despite this institution supporting
function, the veiled protectionism which anti-dumping offers and

1

J.M. Finger, Anti-Dumping: How It Works and Who Gets Hurt (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1993) at 25.
2
Canadian International Trade Tribunal, Annual Report 1995-96 (Ottawa:
Canadian International Trade Tribunal, June 1996).
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the current endemic use of such measures represents a net loss to
the system. Thus, reform is needed. However, any reform must
allow for the existence of a safety valve within the GATT if it is to be
politically acceptable, particularly in the u.s .. A two-pronged
approach to reform is thus recommended. First, the GATT AntiDumping Code should be reformed to require that injury be
defined in relation to all players in the domestic economy, rather
than in relation to a single industry which is the current practice.
Secondly, the safeguard provisions of Article XIX3 of the GA TT
should be relaxed and expanded to allow politically motivated antidumping like action within the trading system, but in a manner
that is both more transparent and more restrictive than the current
use of Article IV.

I. DEFINITION OF DUMPING
One commentator has defined dumping, somewhat facetiously, as
"whatever you can get the government to act against under the
4
antidumping law." Although such a characterization may appear
apt in certain circumstances, dumping is generally understood as
the selling for export at below the domestic market sale price. For
example, selling a product in the Canadian domestic market at $10
u.s. while selling the same product in the u.s. at $8 would amount
to dumping at a margin of $2 per product. This practice is referred
to as international price discrimination and represents dumping in
its traditional form. Since the mid-l 970s, the definition of
dumping has been expanded to include the selling of products in
the export market at below cost price. Such products will be
deemed as dumped irrespective of whether goods within the
domestic market are also sold at below cost price.

3
The provisions of Article XIX of the GATT, along with those of Articles XX and
XXI, are generally referred to as the "safeguard provisions." Article XIX envisions
circumstances in which an importing party can temporarily suspend its obligations
if faced with unforeseen imports that may injure domestic producers. Use of the
safeguard does require agreement of the affected parties, which may involve some
form of compensation. If no agreement is reached the Article allows the affected
exeorting nations to respond with equivalent trade sanctions.
4
Finger, supra note 1 at viii.
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II. DUMPING AND THE GATT
The international trading community, within the confines of the
GATT, officially condones governmental action as a means to protect
domestic industries engaged in the production of like products
from the economic effects of dumping. As such, the anti-dumping
regimes of the contracting parties are legitimated and limited
according to the terms of Article VI of the GATT. Article VI implies
that dumping is an unfair trading practice, one "which is to be
condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established
industry... or materially retards the establishment of a domestic
industry." This article, therefore, allows contracting parties, through
domestic legislation, to offset or prevent dumping by imposing
anti-dumping duties.
More specific regulations concerning the use of anti-dumping
measures were adopted following the completion of the 1968
Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations in what was to be known as
the GATT Anti-Dumping Code. This code was renegotiated and
refined, rather than radically altered, during both the Tokyo (1980)
and the Uruguay (1994) Rounds. The development of the Code
also led to the creation of a Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices
to monitor the anti-dumping activities of the contracting parties
and oversee the Code's dispute resolution committee. In reference
to the development of rules concerning the determination of price,
the investigation period, and what constitutes a like product, K.
Stegemann proclaims that in,
many ways the international regulation of dumping looks
like a model of successful multilateral rule making ...
[as] ... the core of the regulated anti-dumping activities
is solidly legal in the sense that the vast majority of antidumping actions is consistent with the multilaterally
agreed rules and/or their current interpretation by the
5
principal users of anti-dumping measures.

5 K. Stegemann, The International Regulation of Dumping: Protectionism Made
Too Easy (Kingston: Queen's University Department of Economics, 1991) at 1-2.
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ECONOMIC RATIONAL FOR ANTI-DUMPING

Except in a Kafkaesque nightmare, regulation, however successful,
for regulation's sake does not make for a valid policy regime.
Therefore, an evaluation of the relative success or failure of the antidumping provisions of the GATT must be done in light of the overall
purpose of the agreement. The preamble to the GATT speaks of the
need to develop "the full use of the resources of the world and
[expand] the production and exchange of goods" as well as the
desire to "seek the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce." In light of the terms of the preamble and
with regard to the position of Article VI within the GA TT, one
would presume that the use of anti-dumping measures has a sound
economic rationale, and should on that basis be condoned by the
contracting parties. Indeed, GATT negotiators have maintained the
existence of just such a rationale, namely the fear of international
predatory pricing:
Anti-Dumping provisions were first introduced by
Canada in 1904 followed by the United States in 1916
and 1921 to deal with predatory actions by trusts and
cartels which dominated large and highly protected
markets and which could export at prices much lower
than domestic prices with the objectives of destroying
smaller competitors in the importing country. But it
proved very difficult under domestic legal systems to
establish evidence of predatory intent in the case of
foreign firms; thus by 1921 the u.s. like Canada had
adopted an administrative remedy, which was the
6
forerunner of today's anti-dumping systems.

At first glance, anti-dumping actions have an intuitive appeal, at
least within a national framework, as a form of price support to
domestic industry. By protecting the industry from unfair
competition, one in turn protects those employed in such
industries. However, any benefits need to be measured against
those which both domestic consumers and secondary producers
would garner as a result of access to cheaper goods and products.
6

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Delegation of Hong Kong,
Principals and Purposes of Anti-Dumping Provisions, GATT Doc. MTN.
GNG/NGS/w/46, quoted in J. Hagelston "Some Shortcomings of International
Anti-Dumping Provisions" (1991) 25:5 ]. of World T. 99 at 99.
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But if it can be assumed that anti-dumping measures are used in
order to prevent international predation, such a balancing act need
not occur, as anti-dumping measures will in the long term benefit
both domestic producers and consumers. The logic espoused here is
based upon the assumptions of a discriminating monopoly, which
run as follows: In the short run, domestic consumers and secondary
industries would enjoy economic benefits as a result of lower prices;
in the long run however, dumping will lead to the failure of
domestic producers, resulting in higher overall prices as consumers
7
become victims of monopolistic price setting. Although some
claim this reasoning justifying the use of anti-dumping measures
appears cogent, it is only in so far as those companies who are
accused of dumping are actually engaged in international
predation.
Contemporary economic theory has demonstrated that
predatory pricing is a theoretical danger in situations where: one,
there are a very limited number of firms, preferably two, operating
within a domestic market in which a foreign based firm enjoys the
benefits of asymmetrical financial resources; and, two, where the
8
industry concerned is one with significant barriers to entry. If the
use of anti-dumping provisions was limited to situations and
industries in which international predation was a theoretically
possibility, it "would have a major impact on the nature and extent
9
of antidumping activity." These theoretical limits may be further
circumscribed by practical considerations-even given an
opportunity for predation firms maJ' find it less costly simply to
1
collude with domestic producers. In the early 1900s a lack of
economic information made it difficult to demonstrate predation;
it was, therefore, assumed. Current economic analysis indicates that
such a demonstration would not be any easier today, not because of
shortfalls of information or analytic technique, but because the

7

P. Tharakan, "Some Facets of Anti-Dumping Policy" in P. Tharakan, ed., Policy
Implications of Antidumping Measures (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers,
1991) 1.
8
B. Hindley, "The Economics of Dumping and Anti-Dumping Provisions" P.
Tharakan, ed., Policy Implications ofAntidumping Measures (Amsterdam: Elsevier
Science Publishers, 1991) 27. See also Hagelston, supra note 6.
9
Hindley, ibid. at 30.
10
Ibid. at 25; see also Hagelstam, supra note 6 at 99.
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theoretical possibilities are sufficiently limited as to make such
predation in cases of international dumping a practical non-entity.
Some observers are prepared to go even further, suggesting that
not only would anti-dumping activity be significantly curtailed if
its focus was on predatory intent or possibility, but that antidumping policies would cease to exist if that was the case.
Stegemann notes:
Having observed the anti-dumping policies of three
jurisdictions for over a decade, I am not aware of a single
case where it could be argued convincingly that exporters
who were dumping could have hoped to attain a lasting
monopo{y power to exploit buyers in the importing
country.

Since predation is unlikely, both economists and
businesspersons have condemned the GATT's anti-dumping
provisions for their implication that price differentiation, and selling
below fixed cost is somehow inherently wrong and not within "the
12
ordinary course of trade." In respect to below cost pricing,
international practice has been to examine price as a component of
fixed and variable costs over the course of the investigation period.
However, as fixed costs remain constant even if production
decreases, it will often make sound economic sense, especially if
fixed costs are high, to continue production and lower the market
price to a point where full coverage of costs is not realized. As ].
Hagelstam notes, acting rationally places the exporter in an
awkward situation with respect to anti-dumping regimes as "an
entrepreneur who does his duty as a reasonable manager to
minimize the costs of the enterprise in a depressed market can be
. " 13
.
d fior d umpmg.
accused an d sanct10ne
Whether such rational is in itself enough to warrant
condemnation of the GATT's anti-dumping provisions is a matter of
some debate. It has been suggested that if it could be demonstrated
that a depression of world prices was caused by supply overcapacity as a result of the bad investment choices of large foreign

II

Stegemann, supra note 5 at 15.
The GATT in using this phrase seems to imply that the "ordinary course of
trade" is one in which there is no price differentiation between regions, and one in
which goods are always sold above total costs; see GATT Article VI.
13
Hagelstam, supra note 6 at 105.
12
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firms and that general selling below cost might lead to a greater
contraction of the domestic market than the foreign one then a
legitimate case may be made for the intervention of government
14
and the imposition of anti-dumping measures.
In respect to the second element of dumping, price
differentiation, it would appear that the rationally acting manager
may simply be responding to differences in demand elasticity, an
action that all but the most protectionist of commentators would
be hard-pressed to paint as unfair. As Hagelstam demonstrates,
price differentiation is a legitimate and common pricing strategy.
Managers attempting to take in higher profits will price according
to the elasticities of demand in different countries. The smaller the
elasticity, the higher the price that can be recouped from such a
market. Price elasticity is dependent upon factors such as
substitution possibilities, consumer tastes and purchasing powers. As
there would appear to be no reason to presume that such elasticity is
the same in various countries, the threat of anti-dumping action
arising from elasticity based pricing would seem both unfair and
. 11y mente
. d . 15
not econom1ca

IV. ANTI-DUMPING AND NATIONAL
TREATMENT

In addition to the condemnation of anti-dumping measures on the
basis of a lack of a sound economic rationale, it seems reasonable to
note that both the language of Article VI and the administrative
structures borne from it appear to be at odds with one of the basic
pillars of the GATT regime: national treatment. Article III of the
GATT declares that the products imported from a contracting party
"be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to
like products of national origin." Differing institutions and
standards of treatment in relation to similar behaviour for a
domestic producer under existing competition regimes and the
importer under an anti-dumping regime suggests non-compliance
with this GATT fundamental. An argument based on such a
distinction is not in any manner a technically legal one in so far as

14

15

Tharakan, supra note 7 at 5.
HageIstam, supra note 6 at 100.
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texts are to be interpreted in a manner which allows for the triumph
of the specific over the general. Such arguments do, however, when
coupled with the above economic arguments, lend further
conviction to the view that Article VI is in essence a GA TT
aberration.
G. Marceau makes a thorough exposition of this argument in
her examination of both anti-dumping and competition issues
16
within international trade. Before approaching anti-dumping
measures specifically, Marceau examines the analysis of national
treatment as discussed in the GATT Panel Report on Section 337 of
17
the U.S. Tariff Act. In relation to the parameters of national
treatment the panel stated:
On the one hand, contracting parties may apply to
imported products different formal legal requirements if
doing so would accord imported products more
favourable treatment. On the other hand it also has to be
recognized that there may be cases where the application
of formally identical provisions would in practice accord
less favorable treatment to imported products ... For
these reasons, the mere fact that the imported products
are subject under Section 337 to legal provisions that are
different than those applying to products of national
origin is not in itself conclusive in establishing
inconsistency with Article III:4. In such cases, it has to be
assessed whether or not such differences in the legal
provisions applicable do or do not accord to imported
18
products less favourable treatment.

A comparison of competition and anti-dumping regimes within
North America clearly demonstrates that the differing regimes
operate to the disadvantage of foreign exporters. For example,
under Canadian competition guidelines the test for predation is
based, in part, on the reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal in

16

G. Marceau, Anti-Dumping and Anti-Trust Issues in Free Trade Areas
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 104-129.
17
Reproduced in P. Pescatore, W. Davey & A. Lowenfeld, eds., Handbook of
CATT Dispute Settlement (New York: Transnational Juris Publications, 1991) at
158. This case did not involve a dumping issue but rather the application ofu.s. law
in relation to foreign intellectual property standards.
18
Ibid at para. 5.11.
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R. v. Hoffmann-La Roche. The Court held that below cost pricing
is not in itself evidence of predation or predatory intent but that
factors such as duration of pricing levels and competitive
circumstances must be taken into consideration. In the u.s., where
there is no single legal standard in regard to a predation test, R.
Rapp has argued that the following questions are usually asked:
- Is the alleged predator a dominant firm (or does it have
some other advantage that would enable it to become
one)?
- Do market structure and entry conditions make
recoupment of a predatory investment possible?
- Has the alleged predator invested in the destruction of
20
his rivals?

Such considerations are not generally considered by antidumping regimes. The manner in which the similar pricing policies
of firms may be analyzed and condoned as legal under competition
laws while being condemned as an unfair trade practice under antidumping provisions can be illustrated by a cursory
of
1
the provisions of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) and the
22
Competition Act. The prohibition against predatory pricing is
contained within section 50(1) of the Competition Act, which states:
Every one engaged in a business who ... (c) engages in a
policy of selling products at prices unreasonably low,
having the effect or tendency of substantially lessening
competition or eliminating a competitor, or designed to
have that effect is guilty of an indictable offense and is
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two
years. 23

In comparison, section 3 of the

19

SIMA

states:

(1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 694.
R. Rapp, "Predatory Pricing" (1991) 54 Antitrust L. J. 595 cited in Marceau,
sup,_ra note 16 at 111.
21
SpeciallmportMeasuresAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-15.
22
Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34.
23 Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s.50(1).
20
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There shall be levied, collected and paid on all dumped
and subsidized goods imported into Canada in respect of
which the Tribunal has made an order or finding, before
the release of the goods, that the dumping or the
subsidizing of goods of the same description has caused,
is causing or is likely to cause material injury.... 24

Thus a domestic producer's pricing policy will contravene the
Canadian competition regime if it either substantially lessens
competition or if it is intended to do so. In comparison, antidumping law does not address the issues of intent, result, or, as
indicated in the economic analysis above, even the theoretical
possibility of predation. All that is required is evidence that
dumping took place and that the dumping resulted in a material
injury. Although the standard for material injury varies somewhat
within each jurisdiction it is clearly below that required of predation
25
in a competition setting. E. Bakke neatly summed up the differing
results stemming from the application of anti-dumping laws as
compared to competition laws at the 25th anniversary conference of
the Organization For Economic Co-Operation and Development
( OECD) Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices.
Bakke noted:
If the GA TT rules on dumping had been applied in
competition policy, we should not have had much
competition. [As in comparison to anti-dumping laws]
competition policy seeks to stimulate competition,
26
including price competition.

In addition to differing investigatory standards, Marceau notes
that procedural differences in the investigation and prosecuting of
anti-dumping and competition cases tend to infringe upon the
obligation of national treatment. For example, whereas in Canada
and the u.s. competition cases are tried in a court of law which

24 Special!mportMeasuresAct,
25

R.S.C. 1985, c. S-15, s. 3.
To demonstrate this point Marceau uses the example of the bifurcation test in
the u.s., which is applied if the anti-dumping action involves an industry which is
deemed to be in poor health. If it can be shown that dumping has contributed even
minimally to the declining health of the indusny trade measures will be taken. See
Marceau, supra note 16 at 113.
26
Cited in Economic Co-Operation and Development, Twenty Five Years of
Competition Policy, (Paris: OECD, 1987) 31.
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offers the parties full procedural protection and a judgment limited
by stare decisis, anti-dumping cases are prosecuted by governmental
agencies according to the quasi-judicial processes of administrative
law. Administrative law sets lower standards of procedural fairness
and can give rise to allegations of decision making bias as civil
27
servants act as both inquisitors and judges.
While there is some truth in the assertion that an administrative
setting places defenders in anti-dumping cases in a somewhat
weaker position than if they were being heard in a judicial setting, it
must be remembered that prosecutions under competition law are
quasi-criminal in nature and can lead to jail terms on conviction.
Such a difference would appear to justify differing levels of
procedural safeguards.
V. REPLACEMENT OF ANTI-DUMPING LAW
WITH COMPETITION LAW

Given that, first, the economic justification for anti-dumping
measures is weak, and, second, that such measures seem, at
minimum, to violate the spirit of the national treatment provisions
of the GATT, one obvious solution presents itself: the scrapping of all
the anti-dumping provisions of the GATT in favour of competition
law. This would involve the dissolution of anti-dumping law and
the application of domestic competition laws monitored by a newly
created international competition body within the World Trade
Organization (WTo) or the OECD. Such a supra-national body might
also enforce its own set of internationally subscribed to laws and
28
proce dures.
Despite calls for the complete dissolution of anti-dumping
provisions and their replacement with competition laws, such a
happening would appear to be unrealistic given the scope of current
trade policy discussions. Certainly the internationalization of

27

Marceau, supra note 16 at 115-116.
See D. P. Wood, "Unfair Trade Injury: A Competition Based Approach"
(1989) 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1153. See also "Discussion Paper Supports Replacement of
Antidumping with Competition Laws" (1995) 12 Int'! Trade R. 1230; G. Horlick
"The United States Antidumping System" in J. Jackson & E. Vermulst eds.,
Antidumping Law and Practice (Ann Arbor: Universiry of Michigan Press, 1989)
99.
28
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competition policy is an issue of some note within trade circles. M.
Trebilcock echoes the position of the OECD when he argues that
"competition policy is likely to be the next major issue of the trade
29
policy agenda." However, the focus of the existing competition
agenda is not the replacement of anti-dumping provisions with
competition law, but rather the creation of functioning competition
regimes in all trading countries and the promotion of efforts to
encourage the harmonization of domestic competition laws. 30
It could be argued that the creation of an international
competition body with enforceable rights would be a path to the
elimination of anti-dumping even if this were not the intention of
its creators. The institutional outlook of such a body would be by
its very nature opposed to the use of anti-dumping provisions. As
such it could act as a springboard from which to launch attacks
upon the provisions of Article VI and the Anti-Dumping Code.
However, calls for the creation of a body would appear to be
premature at this time. B. Doern and S. Wilks note that the use of
the OECD even as a coordinating body for international competition
reform would be hampered by the role that the OECD has as a
policy group operating in the interest of the western industrialized
states. Furthermore, Doern and Wilks refer to the creation of a new
supra-national competition agency as a virtual "non-starter,"
remarking:
The limited chances of this option are not only due to
the size of the step that must be taken or contemplated.
It is also because there are some inherent limits in the
symbolic and real politics of sovereignty in all the key
.
31
countnes.

29

M. Trebilcock, "Reconciling Competition Laws and Trade Policies" in G. B.
Doern & S. Wilks, eds., Comparative Competition Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996) 268 at 268.
30
B. Doern, "Towards an International Antitrust Authority? Key Factors in the
Internationalization of Competition Policy" (1996) 9:3 Governance 265.
31
G. B. Doern & S. Wilks, "International Convergence and National Contrasts"
in Doern & Wilks, eds., Comparative Competition Policy (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996) 327 at 339. The adoption of such a regime was advocated by group of
mostly German competition academics calling themselves the International
Antitrust Code Working Group during the latter stages of the Uruguay round. The
group sought the establishment of a competition body within the \VTO which would
have had the power to request actions be taken by national antitrust bodies and
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Finally, it has been argued that the elimination of the antidumping provisions of the GATT and the use of competition law in
their stead could flow from an initial conversion within free trade
areas. M. Essary argues that regional agreements "provide an
opportunity to experiment with substantive reform that might
2
someday extend globally.,,s In this regard, a 1995 report by
Industry Canada noted that a "strong case can be made for
replacing existing anti-dumping laws with competition standards,
at least within the context of the North American Free Trade
33
Area." In the EU supra-national competition law has replaced
34
unfair trade laws in relation to other member states. In the course
of the FTA negotiations and in the subsequent NAFTA negotiations
Canada argued alternatively for the use of domestic competition
laws in relation to its free trade partners or for the harmonization of
anti-dumping laws of the NAFTA countries. Such reform was
35
rejected by the u.s.
The existing examples of the NAFTA and the EU suggest that a
reform within free trading groups might be difficult to realize, and
that such reform if possible will not likely, in itself, lead to the use
of competition law principles throughout the global trading system.
If the u. s. is not prepared to forgo the option of using antidumping in favour of competition policy in relation to those with
whom it operates a free trade area, it is unlikely to do so with other
would be able to bring action against such bodies. Its proposals were virtually
ignored by trade negotiators.
32
M. Essary, "The Sphinx Rises: An Examination of Antidumping Laws as The
Emerging Trade Weapon of Choice" in]. McKinney & M. Essary, eds., Free
Trade Agreements of the Americas (Waco: Baylor University Press, 1995) 107 at
116.
33
Industry Canada, Competition Policy as a Dimension ofEconomic Policy cited in
ibid. at 113.
34
Doern & Wilks, supra note 31 at 340.
35
See Canada-United States: Agreement Regarding the Application of Their
Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Law (1996) 35 I.L.M. 309. This
agreement is indicative of the current limits of the u.s. administration on this issue.
The agreement calls for notification of actions and enforcement co-operation
between the u.s. and Canadian competition authorities. The agreement however is
not indicative of any forthcoming non-application of anti-dumping laws in relation
to these two countries. In this regard it should be noted that in the newly negotiated
Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, signed on December 4th, 1996, the
contracting parties have agreed not to use anti-dumping legislation in respect to
each others products. It remains to be seen what effect this arrangement will have
upon future talks concerning Chile's entering into the NAFTA.
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contracting parties of the GATT. In addition, despite the successful
negotiated abandonment of anti-dumping laws within the EU, the
EU remains, along with the u.s., the main user of anti-dumping
measures. This suggests that regional reform may simply result in a
situation in which members of various regional free trade areas
operate in accordance with competition policies amongst
themselves, while at the same time using anti-dumping laws to
protect domestic industry from third party exporters.

VI. GATT 1994
Given the considerable economic argument against the use of antidumping measures, one might have assumed that the elimination or
the radical reformation of Article VI and the Anti-Dumping Code
would have been one of the major outcomes of the Uruguay
Round. However, while anti-dumping was on the agenda, what was
at issue was not its elimination, but its further refinement. 36 Thus,
although some commentators have suggested that the Code has
37
been significantly altered, it is clear upon close examination that
the majority of reforms dealt with procedural rather substantive
issues. Reforms of some significance included the introduction of a
de minimis rule on the margin of dumping at two percent of the
export price, the raising of the de minimis volume of dumped
imports from one percent of the domestic market to three percent
of imports and/or seven percent of the total import share, a "sunset
clause" set at five years on the imposition of any anti-dumping
duty, and a provision which calls for some form of judicial or
administrative review of initial administrative decisions.
Overall, however, the reforms will fail to curtail in any
significant manner the use of anti-dumping as veiled protectionism.
Marceau remarks that whereas technical legality may be improved
by reforms to the Code, "the adopted changes cannot resolve the
most fundamental problems [of the Code] .... Anti-dumping

36

For a general account of the negotiations of the Uruguay Round and a feel for
the relative importance of the various issues see E. Preeg, Traders in A Brave New
World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
37
See M. Hurabiell, "Protectionism versus Free Trade: Implementing the GATT
Anti-Dumping Agreement in the United States" (1995) 16 U. Pa. J. Int'! Bus. L.
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measures remain restrictions on trade and protection against foreign
38
competition." Essary is more forceful in her condemnation of the
Uruguay Round reforms, referring to them as "nothing more than a
J:
J:
•
,,39
ban dage 10r a 1estermg sore.

VII. ANTI-DUMPING AS AN INSTITUTION
MAINTAINING DEVICE

In assessing the reason for the failure to significantly reform the
process despite the economic analysis, it is necessary to keep in
mind that the development of trade policy, as compared to
competition policy, is primarily a political exercise. Economic
analysis by its very nature tends to lose sight of this truth. As H.
Nau notes:
Studies of trade policy making almost always focus upon
systematic or substantive arguments, not on the interest
groups and institutional forces that make these
arguments and use them to struggle to shape trade policy
40
within individual countries.

Nau refers to the political balance which arises out of this struggle
41
as the "knife's edge" on which trade policy turns.
A systemic argument in favour of the anti-dumping provisions
of the GATT does, however, flow from a focus upon the domestic
political nature of trade policy. ]. Bhagwati, writing in support of
anti-dumping, which he acknowledges as a protectionist measure,
notes that an absolute free trade system, the type of system which
appears most logical according to economic theory, risks letting
loose the forces that will result in its eventual destruction. In
support of this proposition Bhagwati offers the following analogy:
"Would one be wise to receive stolen property simply because it was
cheaper, or would one rather vote to prohibit such transactions
42
because of their systemic consequences?" In essence, Bhagwati
argues that the existence of some form of trade barrier is a political
38

Marceau, supra note 16 at xi.
Essary, supra note 32 at 108.
40
H. Nau, Domestic Trade Politics and the Uruguay Round (New York:
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necessity in order to allow for the removal of trade barriers in other
areas. The politics of trade in the u.s. often appear to be both free
trading and protectionist at the same moment. I. Destler refers to
this as a "domestic pressure-diverting management system." 43
Stegemann categorizes these as pressure valve arguments, which he
describes as follows:
The rule-makers realize that domestic political pressure
can be too great to be resisted in all circumstances. In
order to preserve the formal integrity of the system, the
parties permit each other the relative generous use of a
"pressure valve" that has been labeled anti-dumping
policy. Thus, the de facto justification of anti-dumping
measures is based on the systemic need for an escape
clause rather than on the need for regulation of allegedly
d
. 44
.
un fair tra e practices.

Despite the theoretical validity of the safeguard argument, it is
likely that, with the increased use of anti-dumping measures, this
system supporting notion of anti-dumping measures has been
manipulated by vested protectionist interests in a manner which is
economically harmful and potentially system destabilizing,
especially as the number of anti-dumping measures in force world
wide increases. Thus the political safeguard argument should at this
time be a consideration in the reform of the system, rather than an
argument for the maintenance of the status quo and the restriction
of reform to procedural or technical points.

VIII. Focus OF REFORM-DOMESTIC
LEGISLATION OR THE GATT/WTO?
As anti-dumping is not just harmful to the trading system as a
whole but harmful to the economy of the individual country that
imposes the duty, it may be argued that reform efforts should be
focused upon domestic legislation in individual countries rather
than upon substantial reform at the WTO level. After all, the GATT
does not force the contracting parties to impose anti-dumping

43

I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics: System Under Stress (Washington:
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44
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duties but merely offers minimum standards which must be
followed in the investigation of dumping and the imposing of
related duties. Economic studies would seem to indicate substantial
gains from unilateral action. For example, the u.s. International
Trade Commission (nc) concluded that the combined cost of
anti-dumping and countervailing duty orders in 1991 represented a
net loss to the u.s. economy of $1.59 billion. Such arguments have
caused various academics to focus their calls for reform on the
45
domestic trade laws. Calls for unilateral reform are, however,
unlikely to be more than marginally successful. They amount to
easy prey for opposing political interests who will question why
protections which can be afforded under the GATT are being denied,
considering that trading partners refuse to act in a similar manner.
There is thus an undeniable reluctance for governments to initiate
substantial unilateral reform. As K. Steele notes in the Australian
context:
The minister stated that although Professor Gruen had
recommended the repeal of Section 5 (9)[rejection of
sales at a loss as not being in the ordinary course of
trade], the Government did not consider this
appropriate. Other countries such as the u.s., Canada and
the EC which rely on anti-dumping as a means to control
unfair trade practices had and used similar proceedings.
The Australian government was not prepared to provide
Australian industry with a lesser safeguard against unfair
competition than those provided by these other
•
46
countnes.

45

For a u.s. example see C. Barbuto, "Toward Convergence of Antitrust and
Trade Law" (1994) Fordham L. Rev. 2047. Barbuto, recognizing the economic
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REFORM PROPOSALS

The reforms made to the Anti-Dumping Code during the Uruguay
Round are inadequate to overcome the protectionism inherent
within current anti-dumping regimes. E. Vermulst, writing during
the Uruguay round, suggested a number of reforms to the AntiDumping Code. Some of these, such as the development of a
sunset clause have been implemented as noted above,. Other
suggested reforms have not, and represent a minimal standard
which should be agitated for in future multilateral discussions
concerning dumping. Chief amongst these is a proposal that would
amend Article 9 of the Anti-Dumping Code, which currently
attempts to encourage the imposition of a lesser duty by noting
that "[i] t is desirable ... that the duty be less than the margin if
such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the
domestic party." Vermulst argues that the lesser duty standard
should be changed from an exhortatory to a mandatory provision.
Vermulst' s proposed reforms are far from radical. They call for
a tinkering with the current system, a more extensive tinkering than
occurred during the Uruguay round, but a tinkering nonetheless. In
Vermulst's thinking, reform is based upon the notion that the GATT
Anti-Dumping Code is too vague, rather than fundamentally
flawed, leading jurisdictions to "implement unilateral
interpretations, either in law or in practice, and claim GA TT47
consistency where it may not exist." The bulk of his reforms are
thus technical in nature and focus on items such as investigation
periods, definitions of "like fsroduct," notice issues, and
8
determination of market costs. As such, they avoid the real
problems in regard to dumping, namely its protectionist nature,
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One type of non-structural reform which would likely be beneficial, but
admittedly difficult to negotiate into the Anti-Dumping Code, would be a
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and risk what Essary refers to as "due process hell." J. M. Finger
rightly opposes the brand of reform advocated by Vermulst. He
notes:
49

Explicitly outlawing the technicalities that justified
yesterday's actions provides little assurance that
yesterday's cases if repeated tomorrow, would not reach
the same outcome. If yesterday's petitioner succeeded on
the thirteenth try, but that technicality has been banned,
the lawyers simply go on to the fourteenth and the
50
fifteenth.

He argues that in order to curtail the use of anti-dumping as a
protectionist measure, both the Anti-Dumping Code and the
domestic regime must be structured in a manner which allows for
domestic economic interests, who stand to lose when anti-dumping
duties are imposed, to be considered when the assessment of injury
is made. Such a system would shift the focus of institutional reform
from the motive for dumping (i.e. whether predatory or not), to
the effect of such dumping on the domestic economy. A central
feature of dumping reform should therefore be the national
economic interest. In forcing administrative bodies to take into
consideration broader issues than injury to a single producer, antidumping would become "public policy rather than private policy." 51
Public economic policy should of course take the long range view,
which would result in the imposition of duties, if price forecasting
indicates a future monopolistic pricing structure.
In Canada, the SIMA contains a public interest clause that could
serve as a model for WTO imposed consideration of the public
interest. 52 Section 45(1) of the SIMA reads:
Where, as a result of an inquiry referred to in section 42
arising out of the dumping or the subsidizing of any
goods, the Tribunal makes an order or finding described
in any of sections 3 to 6 with respect to those goods and

49
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Ibid. at 70.

It should be noted that EU legislation also contains a community interest
clause. Like Canada's it has been used in very limited circumstances and thus would
appear to be an inadequate model on which to base reform. See Stegemann, supra
note 5 at 29.
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the Tribunal is of the opinion that the imposition of an
anti-dumping or a countervailing duty, or the imposition
of the full amount provided for by any of those sections,
in respect of the goods would not or might not be in the
public interest, the Tribunal shall, forthwith after making
the order or finding, (a) report to the minister of Finance
that it is of that opinion and provide him with a
statement of facts and reasons that caused it to be of that
opinion.5 3

However, since the introduction of the public interest clause in
1984 a full public interest investigation has been undertaken by the
Canadian International Trade Tribunal (cITT) in only three cases,
two of which resulted in a request that a duty of less than the full
54
margin of dumping be imposed. During the Grain Corn
investigation the Tribunal referred to the use of section 45:
Section 45 ... is to be applied on an exceptional basis as,
for instance, when the relief provided producers causes a
substantial and possibly unnecessary burden to users,
downstream producers and consumers of the
product.... The tribunal is not charged with a broad
responsibility for
off benefits to one group
5
against injury to another.

Thus, the Canadian experience with a public interest provision
has not resulted in the analysis of outside economic interests in a
manner that has significantly reduced anti-dumping activity. The
Canadian legislation has two major shortcomings which must be
addressed in any future reform of both the Canadian legislation
and by extension in reform of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code. First,
there are no explicit criteria within the SIMA as to when the public
interest clause is to be used, what interests are to be balanced, and
what sort of economic model should be used in the assessment of
such interests. Second, in the event that the public interest clause is
Speciallmport Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-15, s. 45(1).
See Grain Corn (1987), 14 C.E.R. 1 (crT), Beer(2 October 1991) No. NQ-91002, Refined Sugar (6 November 1995) No. NQ-95-002. A lower margin of
dumping was recommended by the Tribunal in Grain Corn and Beer.
55 Grain Corn, ibid.; see also C. Gasde, "Policy Alternatives For Reform Of The
Free Trade Agreements of The Americas" (1994) 26 Law & Pol'y Int'! Bus. 735 at
761. See also CITT, Grain Corn Public Interest (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services, 1990).
53
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evoked, it is done so after the initial ruling of injury, and, as such,
its application amounts to a retrofit of the usual practice. 56 This
practice perpetuates the notion that the exporter is necessarily
engaged in unfair trading. It also maintains the concept of a right to
a remedy in respect to the domestic producer, albeit a right that the
producer may be robbed of following the application of the public
interest clause. Attempts at reforming the Anti-Dumping Code
should focus upon making public interest a component to be
analyzed in every anti-dumping case, as compared to only in
exceptional circumstances, and should make the determination of
broad domestic economic interests the central feature of whether an
injury has occurred. This substantial reform will be difficult unless
this reform is multilateral in nature.
The recently issued report of the Parliamentary SubCommittee on the Review of the Special Import Measures Act
addresses some of the above criticisms in relation to the SIMA. In its
report the Sub-Committee recommended that "a non-exclusive list
of factors be included in section 45 of SIMA that would guide the
CITT respecting whether and how to conduct a public interest
inquiry.") 7 However, there would appear to be no support for the
notion that public economic interests be included in the
determination of injury.
Although the placement of public economic interest provisions
within a new Anti-Dumping Code should be a central component
of any proposed reforms, reform based on this alone would likely
be doomed to failure in an international context as it does not
adequately account for the aforementioned safety valve component
of dumping duties. Governments are unlikely to abandon a system,
for reasons which are not purely economic in nature, that allows for
the protection of certain industries. S. Hutton and M. Trebilcock,
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conducted an empirical study of thirty Canadian anti-dumping
cases where duties were imposed between 1984 and 1989. They
found that in thirteen cases the imposition of anti-dumping duties
could be justified on the basis of Rawlsian notions of distributive
justice, or on the basis of a communitarian defence of long
58
standing-communities. In addition, arguments have been made
for the use of anti-dumping measures in defence of domestically
produced items which have a security component to them, and in
the protection of infant industry.
In essence, all of these arguments, whether economically valid,
or even GATT compatible, are potentially linked to highly charged
political issues. The international trading structure is dependent
upon political support in each of the contracting nations. A safety
valve is thus needed to prevent any of the above concerns from
eroding general support for freer trade. An economic public interest
clause would by its nature fail to account for non-economic
concerns; and thus, by itself, would be unacceptable to domestic
governments and threatening to the integrity of the system as a
whole. However, the use of Article VI in the above situations
exacerbates dumping generally as it stigmatizes legitimate business
practices as unfair and acts to camouflage protectionism. Thus,
although protectionism in support of the system may at times be
valid, it should occur in conditions where its use is more transparent
and constrained than the use of Article VI and the Anti-Dumping
Code.
Stegemann, as indicated, makes note of the de facto use of antidumping as a safeguard measure, and acknowledges the need for
such safeguards within the GA TT. He argues however that the
trading system would be better served if the existing safeguard
provisions of Article XIX were used in this regard. Article XIX
allows "emergency actions on imports of particular products ... [if]
as a result of unforeseen developments" the importation of a
particular product occurs in such increased quantities and under
such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
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producers. Stegemann argues that the language used in relation to
safeguard measures is more restrictive than in regards to antidumping; it is generally understood that "serious injury" under
Article XIX would require more than "material injury" under
Article VI and because the causation requirement of Article XIX
requires that the injury be caused by "unforeseen developments." 59
However, the scope of Article XIX may be too restrictive to
address the full range of safety valve concerns; thus the notion of
safeguard measures must be expanded to allow governments to act
in favour of social or security concerns. This would allow
governments to raise tariffs and use quotas over a definite period of
time in support of such concerns, enabling them to adapt to
intermittent security concerns or to address social problems caused
by an influx of cheaper imports.
The use of safeguard provisions in this manner would come at
some price for those countries who chose to use them "as they
would have to compensate trade partners for the restriction in
market access for that excluded good presumed to be initially
60
tradable." In order to facilitate the substitution of anti-dumping
in favour of safeguard measures a significant reworking of the
provisions and practices in relation to Article XIX is necessary, not
the least of which would be the need to allow for selectivity in the
application of duties and quotas. The exact direction that
negotiations for reform would take is, however, beyond the scope
of this paper.

X. BARRIERS TO REFORM
Given the failure of the negotiators in the Uruguay Round to move
further on the issue of reform of the Anti-Dumping Code, it is
clear that institutional barriers to wide sweeping reforms exist.
Perhaps the most significant barrier is the u.s. Congress, which has
been traditionally reluctant to adopt any measures which would
appear to encroach upon its ability to act unilaterally to protect
industry against perceived threats. In fact, at the end of the
Uruguay Round there was much debate as to whether Congress
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would adopt into law its obligations in regard to the modest
reforms of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code, and indeed there is still
debate as to whether or not the enacted provisions are in fact GATT
61
compatible. As a result of such politicking Marceau describes the
acceptance of a public interest clause in the u.s. as problematic "as
no congressman would want it used against a petitioner from his
62
district. "
However, Finger notes that public interest in the form of
pressure from downstream producers has been a factor in the
determination of u.s. anti-dumping decisions, most notably in the
63
Flat-Panel Displays Case. In addition, the u.s. Trade SubCommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee has
recently indicated some willingness to examine the relationsh{R
4
between anti-dumping laws and downstream producers.
Furthermore, in accordance with the Article 6.12 of the GATT AntiDumping Code consumer organizations and downstream
producers will be able to participate as parties in ITC investigations.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it seems probable that u.s.
reluctance to facilitate anti-dumping reform may change due to the
fact that the creation of anti-dumping regimes in developing
countries will mean that u.s. industries will increasingly be the
victims of anti-dumping actions in emerging markets. In this regard
Essary notes that in 1994 "some sixty countries, including
Bangladesh, adopted and began implementing their own
65
antidumping laws," and that Mexico since adopting anti-dumping
laws in 1986, has become "a player in the high-stakes trade law
games, beginning numerous dumping cases, particularly aimed at
66
the United States." Other countries are also moving quickly to
enforce their anti-dumping laws. Information collected by the CITT
indicates, in 1990, there were active anti-dumping measures in place
in only four countries other than the traditional users (Mexico, New
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Zealand, and Brazil); but by 1994, this number had expanded to
•
67
sixty.
XI. CONCLUSION
The continuing use of anti-dumping as a protectionist measure is
damaging to the economies of those who use and those who are
effected by such measures. In addition, the veiled nature of such
protectionism is detrimental to the overall integrity of the trading
system. Thus, substantial reform of the system is needed. In
assessing the path to reform, it must be remembered that the
GA TT /wT o is less about free trade and ultimate economic
efficiency, than it is about managed freer trade operating within a
politically delineated reality. As a result, calls for the absolute
abandonment of anti-dumping activity and its replacement with a
competition law regime administered by a supra-national body are
premature. A more effective path to reform would involve the
inclusion of a public economic interest clause within the AntiDumping Code and the expansion of the safeguard provisions
under Article XIX. Such reforms, it is suggested, will limit the use
of anti-dumping by institutionalizing the concerns of players in the
domestic economy other than those of the petitioning industry. At
the same time, the expansion of existing safeguard provisions will
allow for governments to act in defence of certain domestic
political goals, which will in turn act as a safety valve in respect to
the trading system. Furthermore, the transparency of safeguards
will work to enhance the integrity of the system. In addition, such
reform will lead to less anti-dumping type activity because it will
require that compensation be given to trading partners. Finally,
reform along the lines suggested above will have the positive effect
of breaking the artificially created link between price competition
and unfair trading practice.
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